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TUNING OUT HELL’S HARPISTS  
(by Scott Atran, November  2004, Update of Paper Presented to the Permanent Monitoring 
Panel on Terrorism, World Federation of Scientists, Geneva, October 2004) 
 
Recently I returned from the occupied Palestinian territories. Northern Gaza is a charred 
battlefield, and almost every West Bank town is still ringed by guns, barbed wire and 
concrete. The economy is lifeless, except for Ramallah, seat of the Palestinian Authority’s 
dysfunctional ministries and above all the NGOs that bring some activity. Palestinians are 
convinced that Israeli Army checkpoints - where people often wait hours to no avail in 
shadeless no man’s lands or long tunnels - are meant to break their will and drive them from 
the land. Israelis counter that they stop on average at least one suicide bomber a day at the 
checkpoints and that Palestinians confuse cause (suicide bombing) with effect (extreme 
vigilance to stop it).   
 
On one level, the iron-fist policy is working. Data on suicide attacks collected by one of 
Israel's top military strategists, Gen. Isaac Ben Israel, reveals that Hamas operations have 
been severely disrupted, reducing suicide attacks to pre-Intifada levels. He sees this creating 
a "window" to negotiate with moderate Palestinians who represent the majority's wish to 
have a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Ben Israel, who is also a world-class physicist and 
holds a PhD. in philosophy of science, explained that by sundering one-fourth to one-third of 
any system – molecules, information, army divisions, terrorist networks or what have you – 
the entire system either collapses (towards “entropy”) or is forced to become a different sort 
of system altogether (by “mutating”). “In a year there will be no more Hamas,” he asserted. 
“Or,” I countered, “it may just change the way al-Qaeda did.” Like pounding mercury with a 
hammer, military responses alone may breed only more decentralized - and less containable 
- forms of terrorism. 
 
Near the Erez border crossing into Gaza, at Bayt Lahiyah, there is a spic and span 
apartment complex being built with money from the Arab Emirates, rising out of the filth and 
garbage. Israeli bulldozers and tanks have flattened all of the homes just in front of the 
complex, and people just sit by their makeshift tents, some bent over with their heads in their 
hands or just swaying back and forth. A little boy showed me where a bullet had scarred his 
back as he bent over to throw a stone at a tank (it would have gone through his skull had he 
been standing up straight). I asked him if he was looking forward to live in the new 
apartments. He didn't seem to know what I was talking about until I pointed, then his father 
said "bukrah fil mishmish" - tomorrow's apricots (something like “when pigs fly and chickens 
grow teeth”). “We will go on living in filth and dust.” I wasn’t sure if he was referring to the 
likelihood that the Palestinian Authority and their wealthy backers in the Emirates had 
already allotted the apartments to their own cronies (a standard practice), or whether this 
man was referring to prospects for peace. In any event, the little boy said he wanted to die 
as a martyr (shaheed), killing Israelis. The man, closing his eyes and with a deep guttural 
sigh, waved his boy away. 
 
Sacred Values: A Moral Logic Insensitive to Costs and Benefits 
 
Within this vicious spiral attitudes harden. Few in Israel now expect to offer concessions like 
those made at points at Camp David in 2000, Taba in 2001 and Geneva in 2003. The real 
sticking there were not over amount of territory or compensation, but over conflicting “sacred 
values” associated with the Holy Land’s inviolability and a moral Right of Return. Leading 
Palestinian Muslim clerics insist that God will not permit Muslims to cede any sovereignty 
over the Al Haram Al Sharif Mosque compound. For Israel's chief rabbi, it would be 
“sacrilege” to even engage in negotiations over the Jerusalem mount that is also revered by 
Jews. Although polls by the Palestinian Center for Survey and Policy Research show few 
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refugees wanting to take up residence in Israel - only one percent if required to become 
Israeli citizens - Palestinians won’t abandon, and Israelis won’t accept, return as a moral 
right.  
  
Sacred values are not very sensitive to calculations of cost and benefit, to quantity or to 
tradeoffs - a fact ignored in rational choice and risk assessment models that drive much 
political negotiation and counter-terrorism efforts. Consider suicide bombers. The most 
idealistic and often brightest young men prepare to become suicide bombers – martyrs for 
the sacred value of “land and honor” (ard wal ‘ard). I asked all would-be martyrs I 
interviewed questions of the sort, “Is a person a better and more deserving martyr if kills one 
rather ten of the enemy or ten rather than a hundred?” All responded that it wouldn’t matter if 
the martyr killed no one but himself or all the enemy. Said one, “if his intention is pure God 
must love him.”  
  
I also asked: “So what if a your father was dying and your mother found out about the 
operation and asked you to delay it at least until the family could get back on its feet, would 
you?” All answered that there is a duty to family and a duty to God and that the duty to God 
cannot be delayed, even for a minute. “What if a rich relative were to give a lot of money to 
the cause if you postponed your action?” More than one answered: “Is that a joke?” 
Policymakers from nations that fight sacred terror and hope to defeat it need to understand 
that earnest young people are fast reaching the point at which commitment becomes 
absolute and nonnegotiable, and every effort must be made to reach them before their 
dreams end only in apocalyptic hopes of salvation. 
  
Of course, social psychologists will rightly tell you that responses to questions are different, 
more nuanced, if you take a person to side, away from the group, and ask the same 
questions. This leads some academic theorists to argue that apparent commitment to 
absolute moral values is just “posturing.” Here, though, it’s the group context that determines 
action - unto death (the ultimate “behavioral variable”). There is no case of a Hamas 
operative having committed himself to martyrdom who decides to later to withdraw from the 
operation (although there are a few cases form Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Al ‘Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades). These young men persevere not because of threats or physical coercion 
(unlike the Tamil Tigers who may threaten a wavering volunteer for suicide attack with 
actions against the family). On the contrary candidate martyrs are told – and no one doubts 
– that they would be allowed to withdraw any time. But (as with the Japanese Kamikaze) 
candidates also acknowledge that once they take final vows – usually in the form of a video 
testament – retraction would make life unbearably humiliating. 
  
Political scientists and economists, who generally try to explain human behavior in terms of 
“utility,” also point out that if a person truly believes in the rewards of Paradise or in the 
likelihood that his family will be materially rewarded for his sacrifice, then his decision to die 
is a “rational choice.” Theorizing this way about people’s expectations of Paradise is 
speculative, ethnocentric and psychologically groundless, based on no knowledge of what 
motivates someone in a different culture to die for a different cause. Material compensation 
to the martyr’s family is rarely if ever a factor in a person’s decision to blow himself up. Any 
witness to how Israel deals with suicide bombing knows that that risk of material loss almost 
always far outweighs likely gain - the family’s home is usually demolished and surviving 
kinfolk tracked and harassed. Moreover, “If a youth knocks saying he wants to be a martyr to 
get sex in Paradise or money for his family, we slam the door,” huffed one Hamas organizer. 
  
Suicide Bombers: Educated, Idealistic, Psychologically Fit and Socially Committed 
 
 
 
 
 
3
The one place in Nablus where young people easily express optimism in the future is al-
Najah University. More than half of the 12,000 students belong to the Hamas Student Block, 
which has produced more suicide bombers than another demographic group in the country. 
Despite the myths about terrorism that our politicians and pundits spin, none of those 
supporters of suicide terrorism whom I interviewed were poor, uneducated, socially 
estranged, or psychologically deranged. (University of Pennsylvania forensic psychiatrist 
Marc Sageman finds a similar pattern among al-Qaeda recruits). According to psychologist 
Ariel Merari, who has interviewed nearly all would-be suicide bombers who have been 
captured, neither do they likely have a criminal past. They express no hatred of liberty, 
freedom or democracy, and could well embrace these if they had them. The attitudes of 
these students underscore data collected by University of Michigan political scientist Mark 
Tessler and Princeton economist Alan Krueger that suggest that the best predictor of 
popular support for suicide attack is lack of civil liberties and the unresponsiveness of one’s 
own government. 
 
Those who would be martyrs have all the idealism and commitment of educated youth in our 
own culture who think they can solve the problems of their world. At the Universal Forum of 
Cultures in Barcelona, philosopher Dan Dennett recently asked, “Can human beings learn to 
be pure altruists?” Among the youth of Nablus and Gaza you will find an answer. According 
to Sheikh Hamed al-Betawi, the leading Palestinian Islamist cleric and spiritual guide for 
Hamas: “Our martyrs are the purest of the pure. Learned in religion, but also often in 
mathematics or engineering, even the arts. They are not poor or hopeless but full of 
possibilities and hope.” Independent doctoral research by Claude Berrebi and Basel Saleh 
indicate that most Hamas bombers have college education and are economically better off 
than the surrounding population.  
 
These are the prize souls that Hamas strives capture. Unlike regular armies or police, 
revolutionary and insurgent movements can survive only if recruits willingly forego material 
incentives and delay gratification. These movements look for signals of such character, such 
as a candidate’s investment in education. Organizations that sponsor suicide terror go a step 
further: through spectacular displays involving the sacrifice of their precious “human capital” 
(educated youth with better-than-average prospects) they also signal a costly commitment to 
their community, which the community honors by providing new recruits and added funding. 
With more peaceful and legitimate avenues for political expression blocked, this becomes an 
effective way to increase the organization’s political “market share” in the community. In light 
of this compelling rationality, Ben Israel stresses: “I use the word ‘victims’ to describe the 
volunteers for suicide bombing. They are victims of their society.” 
  
Social psychologists have long documented what they call “the fundamental attribution 
error,” the tendency for people to explain human behavior in terms of individual personality 
traits, even when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work. This 
attribution error leads many in the US to focus (unlike Ben Israel) on the individual suicide 
terrorists rather than the organizational environment which produces them. If told that 
someone has been ordered to give a speech supporting a particular political candidate, for 
example, most Americans will still think that the speaker believes what he is saying. Despite 
study after study of individual behavior that shows situation to be a much better predictor 
than personality in group contexts, Americans overwhelmingly believe that personal 
decision, success, and failure depend on individual choice, responsibility, and personality.  
 
Terrorist Networks: Foremost Kith and Kin 
  
For those young people who actually make the sacrifice, moral principle and fervor 
undoubtedly trump rational interest. But the reasons that martyr-sponsoring organizations 
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sacrifice their best and brightest derive more from hard-nosed calculations of utility and 
material consequences, although the foundational assumptions for their religious and 
ideological agenda (as for any religious agenda, whether Muslim or not) lies beyond the pale 
of rational scrutiny. This isn’t to say that the leaders who send out their minions to die are 
merely cynical rational actors, for they too have fire and passion. Berkely economist Robert 
Frank suggests that such manipulation works persistently only if the manipulators 
themselves sincerely make costly, hard-to-fake commitments. “I say to you what I said to 
Israeli intelligence and to 400,000 people at Al Aqsa Mosque,” al-Betawi raged, “I am ready 
to pay the price. I was deported to Lebanon with al-Rantisi and, God willing, I will be a martyr 
too. I know Israeli prisons and so do five of my children, but they know from me that Muslims 
and their culture fear no privation or death.” 
  
Recruitment into Hamas is not like recruitment into the US Army or an American university. 
From interviews in Nablus and Gaza, it seems to be almost entirely a grass-roots operation 
that is bottom up rather than top down in the sense that individuals in the organizations bring 
in other family members, neighborhood friends or co-worshippers from the local Mosque. 
Often the recruiter only implicitly or intentionally recruits those around him by talking to them 
or simply by setting an example. Rarely is anyone given instructions or orders for 
recruitment. (True, US Army recruits tend to come from certain towns and regions, and many 
have had family in the Army, but the social networking in Hamas is much denser and direct). 
  
These decentralized kinship, ethnic and religious networks offer a good foundation for 
sustaining resource-deficient insurgencies because they provide a social structure that can 
underpin the maintenance of reputations and the efficient gathering of information about 
candidate members to ward against defection. No one is going to risk bringing in a potential 
defector from his own family because the defection would sully the reputation of that persons 
whole family. And in Arab society, family reputation based on purity of lineage and honor is 
the still a main determinant of economic, social and political status. This thick web of social 
ties also makes it very difficult for counterintelligence to penetrate. (There is some 
contradictory indication, mostly by Khalid al-Farraj and Abd-al-Rahman al-Rushud, that al-
Qaeda may coerce people into staying who may otherwise wish to leave, but most accounts 
show a recruitment pattern somewhat similar to Hamas). 
  
Through student groups and social clubs that often begin in kindergarten years, Hamas 
creates families of friends and disciples who are just as willing to sacrifice for one another as 
sibling for sibling or a parent for a child. These culturally manipulated loyalties mimic and (at 
least temporarily) override genetically based fidelities to kin while securing belief in sacrifice 
to a larger group cause. The mechanism of manipulation resembles that of the US or Israeli 
army, which trains soldiers in small groups of committed buddies who then grow willing to 
sacrifice for one another, and only derivatively for glory or country (motherland, fatherland). 
(Consider the Oath to Jihad taken by recruits to Harkat ul-Mujahideen, a Pakistani affiliate of 
the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders, the umbrella organization 
formed by Bin Laden in 1998. The oath affirms that, by their sacrifice, members help secure 
the future of their family of fictive kin: “Each [martyr] has a special place among them are 
brothers, just as there are sons and those even more dear.”)  
 
Evolutionary Reverberations: Kin Altruism, Vengeance, Romantic Love 
 
Kin altruism is a yearning rooted deep in human evolutionary biology, which group leaders 
become expert at in turning to their advantage. Another profound evolutionary motive for 
human social and political action is revenge. Nobel Prize winning ethologist Konrad Lorenz 
noted that when a weaker animal bares its teeth to threaten a stronger animal, the stronger 
one will sometimes back off because the expected cost of battling the weaker foe rises to 
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where the stronger animal calculates that it’s just not worth the effort. When a person vows 
to avenge an insult or humiliation no matter the cost, even if it means losing his own life and 
shows that he means it with costly and hard-to-fake displays of preparation for attack then 
anyone planning an insult will think twice before acting. In terms of primate evolution, 
including human evolution, accepting humiliation means not only a loss of self-worth but is 
signal proof of inferiority and probable extinction in the social competition for status, wealth, 
mates and a place in the sun. Revenge can give even the weak a better chance to survive in 
the long run.  
  
Often just displaying sincere preparation for revenge is enough to deter a would-be 
aggressor. To convince the other side that your side is sincerely willing to go beyond any 
rational limit for self-preservation, part of the display will usually include suggestions of an 
automatic triggering mechanism. This implies that when the aggressor goes too far, then the 
display turns into counter-aggression that cannot be stopped even if one or both sides 
wanted to change course. According to University of Maryland political scientist Thomas 
Schelling, this was a basis for the Cold War defense strategy of mutually assured 
destruction, or MAD. 
  
Although such apparently irrational strategies override rational calculations and control, they 
do make reasonable sense in the “longue durée,” that is, from the evolutionary vantage of 
our species. On the average, and over the long run, it is to a person’s advantage to employ 
such a strategy even at the cost of immediate self-interest and even if, on occasion, the 
person dies acting out the strategy. This is even clearer with kin altruism. As the biologist 
William Hamilton showed, in the evolutionary long run what matters is not whether an 
individual dies young but whether the organism’s genes survive. People are mortal but their 
genes drive them to act in ways that allow the genes themselves to achieve a kind of serial 
immortality. If by sacrificing ones life for a close family member, a person’s genes have a 
better chance of being passed on down the line, then it becomes much more likely that the 
person will make the sacrifice. Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker emphasizes that these 
sorts of sacrifices needn’t be, sometimes can’t be, and often shouldn’t be consciously 
thought out. Our emotions have evolved to unconsciously push us to immediate decisions 
that likely have long-term value. (Think of sex, which the emotions provoke for instant 
pleasure, but which evolution designed for long and laborious reproduction).  
  
But such emotionally-driven strategies, because they can trump reason, also get out of 
control – for example, with suicide bombers who usually lose their lives (not just "on 
occasion") before having a chance for them or their kin to reproduce. Duels at sundown and 
never-ending family vendettas, like the Hatfields and McCoys, are also derivative forms of 
this behavior gone beyond control. Hamas leaders and followers nearly all stress that 
revenge is for national  – not personal – humiliation (idhlal), which will probably take more 
than a lifetime of struggle. “We fight for dignity (karama), nation (watan), religion (din) and Al 
‘Aqsa,” Betawi preached to me, citing the Quran (Al-Tauba 111) “God brings souls to 
Paradise killing the enemy and getting killed – that is the high principle of jihad (mabada 
samia fil jihad).” Harvard political scientist Jessica Stern, after years spent interviewing 
terrorists of every color who target civilian noncombatants, surmises that humiliation is the 
one common motivator for them all. 
  
I asked Betawi: “Why do you think God created some people to kill and some to be killed?” “I 
will tell you,” he nodded, “God creates all people equal but He gives them a choice – the 
choice of submission (islam) and Heaven or war (harb) and Hell. Our martyrs (shohada) are 
warriors of God (mujahideen) not terrorists (muharbiyeen). That is why I issued a religious 
edict (fatwah) that they will go to heaven. They are not afraid of anything. They will fight until 
jihad has ended.” “And when is that?” I pressed. He drew back his sleeve and waved a 
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surprisingly powerful forearm: “When injustice has ended. When this global regime – the 
snake with America as its head - is destroyed.” This was the first time since I began talking 
with Hamas shortly after its founding in 1987 that I sensed the mission of national 
redemption merging with Global Jihad. (Israel and the US claim this was true even before 
September 11, but there was little evidence for it then, and there is an element now of self-
fulfilling prophecy). 
 
In the arts department at al-Najah I was led through an exhibit whose boast was "Martyrs 
give us dignity to free ourselves.” The blazing eyes in two paintings of covered faces 
resembled the intense gazes of the two artists nearby. “Who are these martyrs?” I asked. 
“Soon to be, if God wishes,” answered one. Their yearning for Paradise is conveyed through 
images of another apparently irrational longing, romantic love, incarnated in the black-eyed 
maidens of martyrs’ heaven. Sincere expressions of romantic love - which occur in all 
cultures, most powerfully among young adults - signal a person’s enduring commitment to 
another person, even in situations where forsaking the loved one would accrue more 
immediate benefits (say, a more attractive, richer or more fertile partner). 
  
Key to intercepting fatal commitment before it solidifies, then, is grasping how, like good 
commercial advertisers but to ghastlier effect, charismatic leaders of martyr-sponsoring 
organizations turn ordinary desires for kinship, religion, status and love into cravings for the 
mission they are pitching, to the benefit of the manipulating organization rather than the 
individual manipulated. (Much as the pornography or fast food and soft drink industries 
manipulate innate desires for naturally scarce commodities like sex or fatty foods and sugar 
to ends that may reduce personal fitness but benefit the manipulating institution).  
 
The mock up of Paradise at the al-Najah Martyr’s exhibit included a small pool of water, 
covered with plastic flowers and leaves, and surrounded by paintings of red and white roses 
and recently slain Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdul Azziz Rantisi. Little teddy 
bear key chains were offered, and books sold – most prominently the “Islamic Manifesto,” 
Milestones, written in prison by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Sayyid Qutb just before he was 
hanged in 1966 for sedition by Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser.  
  
The anti-Semitic tract, Protocols of the Elders of Zion, was also on sale. I asked:  “What if 
you take a child from a Zionist family at birth and raise him in a good Muslim family, would 
the child grow up to be a good Muslim, a bad Muslim or a Zionist.” “A good Muslim,” all 
around answered. Merari told me that in his interviews with Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails 
he also found no systematic Nazi-like racial hatred, despite the negative social stereotypes 
about Jews. 
 
A person is what his surroundings make him,” said the Block leader. “Then why do you kill 
Israeli children?” I shot back. “We do not target the children,” he calmly explained, “but we 
do not mourn them if they are killed on an Israeli bus or if the children happen to be in the 
way (awlad yaktarunna haqada fil tariq) because Israeli society will turn them into soldiers 
who will try to kill us. Would we do an operation like the one that Sheikh Bin Laden did to 
America or our Chechen brothers did in Beslan? No, that is not our way, although what 
happened in Beslan is understandable and even justifiable because the Russians have killed 
so many Chechen children.”  
  
I posed the same question that I had posed to al-Betawi. “You say ‘An eye for an eye,’ but 
then won’t the whole world become blind?” he answered much as did al-Betawi: “Should we 
turn the other cheek or offer flowers? Do the Jews or Christians? We fight with any means 
(ayit wasalah). They have tanks, planes and atom bombs. We have human bombs (qanabil 
bi sharia). When they stop killing us we will stop killing them.” I lectured that the fourth 
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Geneva Convention is all about ends not justifying means, no matter how just or unjust a 
war. “Do the Americans who raped innocents at Abu Ghraib honor the Geneva Convention?” 
he retorted. “Do the Israelis honor the Geneva Convention when they kill our children?” 
  
Hamas talk of justice against oppression is “a big lie,” counters Ben Israel. “So, what is the 
target if not the children? The bus by itself? Who were the other persons in the bus or in a 
restaurant? Soldiers? No, they were all either children or women or male civilians, and I think 
this is the main moral difference between guerrilla fighters, freedom fighters and the 
terrorists. I don't think that what happens in Iraq, for example, is terrorism when actions are 
directed against the ruling forces. When an Israeli army unit is attacked in the occupied 
territories, it is not terrorism. But bombing children in a bus with the excuse that one day they 
will be soldiers is a morally wrong attitude. What will prevent us from dropping some dooms 
day weapon on Gaza and end the conflict with the Palestinians in a few seconds? Or, not to 
be so extreme, to send our air-force to bomb daily refugee camps, with conventional 
weapons (I estimate we can kill more than 10,000 people a day in this "method"). The only 
‘obstacle’ is ethical.” 
 
A senior Hamas organizer in Gaza’s Jabaliyah refugee camp frowned when I smiled at the 
children running home from school.” Why do you smile? We can’t smile until we take back 
our life from the Israelis. When you see our children you should weep because the best hope 
for them now is to become martyrs.” “So all should become martyrs,” I asked. “Not all our 
people are heroes,” he shook his head, “but our youth are running to martyrdom. With so 
many we must carefully select, case by case, who has courage and purity of heart.” I wanted 
to know if he would accept a two-state solution. "Never," he said, "all of Palestine must be 
Muslim."  "And the Jews?" I asked. "Let them go back to New York and Russia. Those born 
in Palestine may stay as long as they submit to Muslim rule and law." 
  
An earnest young man of twenty cleared a seat for me from the rubble and garbage, “I 
choose to be a martyr because my life is dear to me, my family and my people. We must 
show Israelis that Palestinian lives aren’t cheap.” He was as compassionate in manner as 
anyone I’ve interviewed in my anthropological sojourns among the worlds cultures and as 
bright as any student I’ve taught science to. He so reminded me of my own son that I just 
lost it for a moment and turned my head away. He seemed to understand and tried in his 
own way to console me: “Never mind, I won’t just give up my life. Our leaders don’t think 
once or twice, but ten, even a hundred times if it’s worth it. If they can do a roadside 
bombing they won’t use me. I’ll be saved for a big operation.”  This young man could 
contemplate the costs and benefits of a roadside versus suicide bombing within the group’s 
moral frame, though it was beyond doubt that sometime soon he must die to kill. I asked 
him, "And what would make you and other stop thinking about becoming martyrs?" He 
smiled ruefully and said, "When Palestine is again Muslim." 
 
On a second floor walkup off a narrow alley in Jabaliyah I interviewed the family of Nabeel 
Masood, the sixteen year-old from Al ‘Aqsa Martyrs Brigades who exploded himself in 
Ashdod in April. The neighborhood knew him as a kind and gentle boy, but he changed after 
the death of his two favorite cousins, who were Hamas fighters. His mother was reading a 
letter when I walked in the door, and handed it to me: 
 
 “Mr. and Mrs. Masood, it gives me great pleasure to inform you that your son Martyr 
Babeel[sic], has passed his tests successfully in the 11th grade. He was first in his class. He 
was distinguished not only in his hard studying, sharing, and caring, but also in his good 
morals and manhood. I would really like to congratulate you for his unique success in both 
life and the hereafter. You should be proud of your son’s martyrdom.” 
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I asked his father, “Do you think the sacrifice of your son and others like him will make things 
better for the Palestinian people?” “No,” he said, “this has not brought us even one step 
forward.” The boy’s mother only wants the pieces back of her son’s body and the father has 
emptied the house because it is Israel’s policy to destroy any martyr’s family home although 
he and his wife would have done anything to stop their son if they had known. “It can’t go on 
like this,” the father lamented, “There can only be two states, one for us and one for the 
Israelis. Nabeel’s friends, classmates and neighborhood youth disagree: “His courage will 
make us free,” is the refrain.  
 
In The Descent of Man and The Expression of Emotion in Men and Animals, Charles Darwin 
noted that young males - roughly between 16 and 25 - commit nearly all human violence, 
especially when they feel pushed to the wall. Aggression and counter-aggression evolved in 
young men to help them fight to spread their genes. But gray men have learned to harness 
and direct a young man’s passion for their own purposes. Chanting hymns of heaven, these 
harpists of hell pluck the evolutionary strings that drive the sacrificial young.   
 
I returned to Israel on a Friday evening. Unlike Jerusalem, which is quiet on the Jewish 
Sabbath, Haifa atop Mount Carmel was alight. Joyful groups of high-school girls were 
scurrying everywhere. I asked three hitchhikers who were holding hands, just like my 
daughters do with their friends, if anything special was up. “Yes,” said one girl, very sweetly, 
“So you’re not from Haifa; you see it’s a weekend and holiday, and no school!” Hamas 
leaders contend that these young girls, too, merit death because they will become Israeli 
soldiers. The Hamas weekly, Al Risala, proclaimed in an editorial that “martyrs are youth at 
the peak of their blooming, who at a certain moment decide to turn their bodies into body 
parts - flowers.” In a moment of naive epiphany, I knew that if this blossoming young woman 
could just spend a little time with one of these young men from Gaza neither would need to 
die. But the wall broadens between them each passing day, blocking all human touch. 
 
The best hope to stop suicide terrorism will not be found in psychological profiling, more 
learning, economic programs or physical elimination because those willing to die to kill are 
mostly normal, educated, materially sufficient and in abundant supply. We would do better to 
understand how terrorist groups “acculturate” recruits and exploit biologically deep desires 
for dignity and belonging, and why the surrounding community abides self-elimination of its 
most precious parts. One thing for certain, these idealistic youths aren’t nihilists who “hate 
freedom,” contrary to the mantra of politicians and pundits who dehumanize them to better 
mobilize our public for fight. To break the culture of martyrdom that is exploding across the 
world we must offer these young people alternative ways to socialize their needs and 
passions. History suggests that democracy is a good bet, but one too willingly postponed 
when results may be undesirable  
 
Political Postscript: Post-Arafat and Hamas  
 
In nearly everyone’s view, Yasser Arafat’s death has opened a new window onto the Middle 
East “Road Map for Peace,” launched in 2003 by the United Nations, the European Union, 
Russia and the US to achieve a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian settlement by 2005. Until 
now, the US focus on the Road Map had been tacit support for Israel’s efforts to undermine 
Mr. Arafat, the Palestinian Authority’s ever popular but increasingly ineffective leader, block 
elections for fear of renewing his mandate, and kill off Hamas leaders. President Bush and 
Prime Minister Sharon still come up short on concrete steps for the Road Map, and hedge 
against it being implemented by next year as originally planned, or even by the end of either 
leader’s tenure. But there is little doubt that the US and Israel want to help PLO head 
Mahmud Abbas, Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmad Qurie, Foreign Minister Nabil Shaat, and 
their friends. US and Israeli leaders are aware of the need to ease pressure on the 
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Palestinians so that elections can be held in the next few months as this moderate 
leadership plans.  
 
Coming on the heels of the Afghan vote, and timed to begin shortly before Iraqi elections 
scheduled for early next year, a peaceful Palestinian election process could revive hopes for 
a settlement (and possibly help with Iraq). The prospect of “liberty” transforming the Middle 
East would suddenly seem more than the far-fetched rhetoric of earlier this year when the 
US stymied Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s election efforts in Iraq and tacitly supported Israel’s 
belligerent refusal to let Palestinians register to vote. 
 
The problem, cautions Israeli historian Reuven Paz, former director of Shin Beit’s research 
division and of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, is that Hamas has 
become “the most authentic representative of Palestinians in the Territories, unlike the old 
national establishment of the PLO and Palestinian Authority.” Gen. Ben Israel, a chief 
architect of Israel’s current counter-terrroism campaign, believes that Hamas will lose the 
elections only “as long as it cannot show results in terms of dead bodies. Therefore, I don't 
see any contradiction in killing the activists of this group while trying to come to some 
political agreement with others. Paradoxical as it sounds, attacking Hamas will help the 
moderate Palestinian forces. Elections are very important for establishing their authority, and 
Hamas will not win if they don’t have known political leaders left who have the support of the 
masses.” 
 
Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, doesn’t 
think that Palestinian majority-support for Hamas suicide actions translates into support for 
its political program. The center’s polls indicate most Palestinians would accept the two-state 
solution that Hamas rejects. The polls also forecast a winning electoral coalition of moderate 
“old guards” with more militant but mostly secular “young guards.” Shikaki believes the best 
way to defang Islamists and produce a political settlement is to bring them into parliament. 
But to keep the process on track, how to stop Hamas from suicide attacks and the Israeli 
army from targeted assassinations, which each side sees as very cost-effective actions 
against the other in the short term? Washington has (limited) influence over Israel, but no 
one seems to have leverage over Hamas. 
At the moment, all Palestinian factions seem interested in preventing intra-Palestinian 
violence. But Hamas has already decided to boycott the elections for the presidency of the 
Palestinian Authority – an authority that stems form the 1993 Oslo accords that Hamas 
shuns. Moreover, Hamas regularly resorts to suicide bombings to bolster its political 
fortunes, and Israel will not hesitate to strike back. In any event, Sheikh Hamed al-Betawi, 
the leading Palestinian Islamist cleric and Hamas spiritual guide, forewarns: “All of Palestine 
is Muslim and Israel will be expelled, if not now, later - just like the Crusaders and Mongols 
were expelled. We can accept a ceasefire, but not forever.” Hamas leaders never use the 
word salaam - peace - in dealing with Israel, only hudnah - pause. Notes Ben Israel: “Even 
the Al-‘Aqsa Brigades who are engaged in murderous terrorism, still are reporting to Fatah, 
and therefore view their actions as a struggle toward some compromise between the two 
peoples. Hamas is not ‘fighting’ for the same cause.” 
Israeli settlers who refuse to evacuate Gaza also proclaim sacrifice and duty to God with 
hard-to-fake commitments, rejecting offers of hundreds of thousands of dollars in individual 
compensation with displays of outrage and disgust. The hold that sacred values have over 
the heart and mind is not easily sundered because – for good or bad – they speak to deeper, 
more enduring yearnings. Consider that a large segment of the US population, the rural and 
religious working poor, seems to have voted in November against its rational self interest in 
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favor of symbolic affirmations for policies that have arguably produced only negative effects 
on its everyday economic life.  
 
Some years ago, when secular ideology and reasoning seemed triumphant everywhere, 
French statesman and literary giant André Malraux wrote: "The 21st century will be spiritual, 
or won't be." We all seem to be living under the Chinese curse of "interesting times," when 
the deepest parts of human nature erupt into politics and again tear history wide open. A 
Gallup survey carried out in 60 countries and released in November showed that people 
around the world largely mistrust their leaders and nearly half fear the future will be less safe 
for their children. Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might secure history new direction. 
 
Historical Epilogue: Humanity’s Birth and Last Great Hope  
.  
“Civilization is intermittent.” 
-          Menahem Begin 
  
To capture the hearts and souls of people around them, terrorist groups provoke their 
enemies into committing atrocities. Two millennia ago, the first Jewish Revolt against Roman 
occupation began with youths throwing stones, and Roman commanders telling their 
soldiers to sheathe their swords and defend themselves with wooden staves. The Jewish 
Zealots and Sicarii (“daggers”) upped the ante – much as Hamas would do later against 
Israelis and Iraqi insurgents increasingly do against America’s coalition - attacking Roman 
soldiers and their Greek underlings in self-sacrificial acts during public ceremonies. The 
Sicarii, who claimed to be freedom fighters but whom the Romans deemed terrorists, 
modeled their mission on Samson, who centuries before had brought down on himself a 
Philistine temple to help Israel.  
 
The Jewish revolt ended with collective suicide of perhaps hundreds of Sicarii warriors and 
their families at the desert-fortress of Masada in 73 A.D. But that was hardly the end of the 
story. This “heroic” death inspired two subsequent revolts, ending with Rome expelling all 
Jews from Judea, including many Christians who still considered themselves Jews. Judea 
became “Palaestina,” renamed for the Philistines. The Jewish Diaspora spread a 
universalizing faith to the far corners of the world, eventually converting the Roman emperor 
Constantine and the Arabian trader Mohammed to monotheism.  
 
Ever since the Enlightenment, the modern world’s major movements – the big “isms” of 
recent history - have been on a mission to invent “humanity” by saving it and making it their 
own. Modernism is the industrial legacy of monotheism (however atheist in appearance), 
secularized and scientifically applied. No non-monotheistic society (save Buddhism perhaps) 
ever considered that all people are, or should be, essentially of a kind. To many in our 
society, the 20th-century demise of colonialism, anarchism, fascism and communism left 
history’s playing field wide open to what Lincoln besought as “the last great hope of 
mankind,” our society’s ideal of democratic liberalism (though Lincoln, like Jefferson, foresaw 
that the U.S. would “meanly lose” this hope if advanced by the sword).   
 
The trouble with missionary modernism– is that those who do not accept falling into one’s 
own camp - say, “The House of Islam” or “The House of Democracy”- automatically belong 
to “The House of War” and “Evil.” That means that a great chunk of residual humanity 
remains destined to be despised and warred upon. Even after 9/11, there is scant 
recognition that unforseen events of history perpetually transform or destroy the best laid 
plans for historical engineering. Yet the catastrophic wars and revolutions of the modern era 
teach us that the more uncompromising the design and the more self-assured the designer, 
the harder both will fall. President Bush, in his preamble to The National Security Strategy of 
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the U.S., seems to reach a contrary conclusion – that these great struggles demonstrate “a 
single sustainable model of national success… right and true for every person, in every 
society.”  
  
If we take an evolutionary perspective on history, which frames success and failure in terms 
of the growth or decline of traits over populations (and, eventually, in terms of the growth or 
decline of populations themselves), then current U.S. (or Israeli) antiterrorism policies do not 
seem adaptive. Support for the U.S. (and Israel) is declining in the world as support for 
terrorism increases. Moreover, U.S. (and Israeli) procedures to combat terror are often 
predictable and reactive, whereas increasingly many people in the world perceive the 
terrorists to be innovative and proactive. Such perceptions - even if short-sighted - invariably 
act upon the future in unpredictable ways that make it folly and hazardous to believe in the 
constancy “clashing civilizations,” the inevitability of the world’s globalization 
(“Americanization” for some), an overriding “logic of human destiny,” or some guiding spirit 
that ultimately causes “the end of history” and political struggle in a “fully rational” (secular, 
democratic, economically liberal) world. 
  
Defend against Jihadism we must, and help it to burn itself out. But let’s not add life to its 
forlorn mission by unrelentingly muscling others with our own. Preempting and preventing 
sacred terror requires that policymakers make a concerted effort to understand the 
background conditions as well as the recruitment processes that inspire people to take their 
own lives in the name of a greater cause. Current political and economic conditions that 
policymakers currently monitor are important although not necessarily determinant. Rather, 
what likely matters more is the promise of redeeming real or imagined historical grievances 
through a religious (or transcendent ideological) mission that empowers the militarily weak 
with unexpected force against enemies materially much stronger. This was as true for 
Jewish Zealots who sacrificed themselves to kill Romans two millennia ago as it is for 
modern Jihadists.  
 
Clearly, none of this necessitates negotiating with terrorist groups that sponsor martyrs in the 
pursuit of closed societies. For these groups and already committed individuals, using hard 
power may be necessary. The tens of millions of people who sympathize with them, 
however, are likely open to the promise of soft-power alternatives that most Arabs and 
Muslims seem to favor—participatory government, freedom of expression, educational 
possibility, economic choice. The historical precondition for such opportunity, as well as the 
popular legitimacy of any form of governance, to be effective, however, is to ensure that 
potential recruits in the Arab and Muslim world feel secure about personal safety as well as 
their cultural heritage. Although such soft-power efforts may demand more patience than 
governments under attack or pressure to reform tend to politically tolerate in times of crisis, 
forbearance is necessary to avoid increasingly catastrophic devastation to the future hopes 
of peoples who aspire to soft empowerment from an open society and free world. 
 
Biologist Ernst Mayr tells us that the average life span of a species on earth is about 100,000 
years -more or less the current age of Homo sapiens.  Perhaps Lincoln was right that 
democracy is humankind’s final gamble, though evolution and history also teach that if we try 
to reduce variation to one basic form for all, and wall off those who do not readily fit our own 
image and self-interest, then we will probably bring on our own collapse.  
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